Space & Astronomy/Space and Astronomy (October 1993).iso/pc/text/spacedig/v15_2/v15no229.txt

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Date: Tue, 22 Sep 92 05:04:18
From: Space Digest maintainer <[e-mail]>
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Subject: Space Digest V15 #229
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Space Digest                Tue, 22 Sep 92       Volume 15 : Issue 229

Today's Topics:
                        Commercial Space News
              New lunar spacecraft (& old data formats)
                              Population
             Space Platforms (political, not physical :-)

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Date: 20 Sep 92  21:26:52
From: [e-mail]
Subject: Commercial Space News
Newsgroups: sci.space

COMMERCIAL SPACE NEWS 16

   This is number sixteen in an irregular series on developments in
commercial space activities. The commentaries included are my
thoughts on these developments.
   Commercial space data has been piling up faster than I can
process it into these columns, so I finally just threw out
everything older than about a month, and cut this down to a more
manageable size.  Even so, there's still more than one column's
worth of interesting developments... sigh...

Contents -
1- NASDA DELAYS H-II PROGRAM; RSC'S COMMERCIAL ENTRY SLIPS
2- FIRST ROUND OF US/RUSSIAN SPACE LAUNCH TRADE TALKS BEGIN
3- INMARSAT CREATES CONTROVERSY WITH LAUNCH SERVICES RE-BID
4- ATLAS/CENTAUR FAILURE CHALLENGES GD'S LAUNCH BUSINESS
5- "WHITE KNIGHT" FOR CAPE YORK? ONE MORE (LAST?) ATTEMPT ...
6- SKYPIX IN BANKRUPTCY COURT; HUGHES DIRECT TV MOVES FORWARD
7- JOINT VENTURE TO PRODUCE ELECTRIC SATELLITE PROPULSION UNITS
8- STATE OF ALASKA TO BACK COMMERCIAL SMALL LAUNCH COMPANY?
9- THREE FIRMS AWARDED INITIAL LEO COMMUNICATIONS ALLOCATIONS
10- LANDSAT COMMERCIALIZATION MAY BE REVOKED

ARTICLES
 ----------------------------------------------------------------
1- NASDA DELAYS H-II PROGRAM; RSC'S COMMERCIAL ENTRY SLIPS
   Japan's National Space Development Agency (NASDA) has slipped the
first launch date for the new H-II booster by at least 1 year after
a test failure with the LE-7 engine.  The LE-7 cryogenic LOX/LH2
engine development program has been plagued with problems over the
past several years.  After an engine caught fire during a 18 June
test, it was decided to redesign part of the engine, forcing a 1
year delay in the program.
   Since the LE-7 is used to power the first stage of the H-II
vehicle, the first flight of the H-II also slips to early 1994.
This delay in fielding the H-II also delays entree of the H-II into
the commercial launch market through Rocket System Corp (RSC), a
consortium of Japanese aerospace companies.  RSC had begun to bid
the H-II into launch competitions for launches in 1995 and later.
   [Commentary:  NASDA had expected to spend about $1.9 B on the H-
II development, but problems with the LE-7 engine have caused cost
growth and schedule slippage.  The delay of the H-II into the
commercial launch market provides a little bit of breathing space
for US and European launch providers, who had begun to sharpen their
pencils to make sure they could competitively bid against RSC and
its large financial resources.   The H-II delay also possibly opens
up a small launch market for Japanese-origin satellites which were
planned to be launched on the H-II and which might now be shifted to
Ariane or Atlas rather than accepting the 1 year delay.
   It is also interesting to note that RSC will be inheriting a $1.9
B investment in technology and facilities by NASDA when beginning to
bid for commercial contracts.  A similar argument has been leveled
against Arianespace by General Dynamics, who has invested several
hundreds of millions of corporate funds to compete against Ariane.
This topic has been raised in the GATT negotiations between Europe
and the US and will undoubtedly also become a topic in the trade
talks between the US and Japan, when RSC begins to seriously offer
the H-II on the commercial market.]

2- FIRST ROUND OF US/RUSSIAN SPACE LAUNCH TRADE TALKS BEGIN
     The first round of bilateral space launch trade talks between
the US and Russian governments took place the week of 1 Sep with a
2-day exchange of data. This round was designed to set a common
basis of knowledge of each side's systems and plans before more
detailed negotiations would start. Russian negotiators, led by the
head of the Russian Space Agency (Yuri Koptiev), presented data on
the Russian launch industry and Russian government support given to
the industry.  In response, the US government presented an overview
of the US space launch industry and how the US government supports
its space launch industry.
    The next round of talks are planned for Moscow next month,
although exact dates have not yet been released.
    [Commentary:  These talks are planned to establish "rules of the
road" between the US and Russian governments for Russian
participation in the international space market.  Similar talks have
been taking place for some years between the US, Chinese, and
European governments.  Their purpose is to establish general
guidelines under which future procurements can be offered and
accepted, including the launch of US satellites on Russian boosters
and vice versa.  These bilateral talks were agreed to during the 17
June Washington summit meeting of Presidents Bush and Yeltsin.
   The importance of establishing "rules of the road" for commercial
firms is obvious - as they pave the way for real, routine commercial
transactions between Russian and US commercial space entities.  Over
the past several months there have been a plethora of strange and
disjointed claims about Russian launch and satellite systems being
offered in the US, most of which have been found to be spurious.
Part of blizzard of misinformation has caused by removal of
centralized control over the representation and marketing of ex-
Soviet systems and a desperate scramble of ex-Soviet design and
manufacturing agencies for funds.
    I expect these "rules of the road" talks to define on what basis
the Russian government will allow pricing of launch systems, and
what level of direct and indirect government support to the offering
entities will be acceptable.  Rumors within the industry have
indicated that some Russian bureaus have been pricing commercial
offerings on the basis of their old "accounting rules" which only
charged to the product the direct effort of the Russian bureau.
Essentially, this treats all supplied parts and services as "free",
and only the direct cost of assembling the system has been quoted to
Western bidders.  These accounting rules are changing, but before
they can be eliminated for more realistic market-based rules, the
Russian government must establish some type of acceptable transfer
pricing mechanism (by "acceptable", I mean acceptable to the Russian
government).  Without this, the Russian government will continue to
be used to subsidize industrial supply and prices without regard of
the long-term viability of an industrial organization.  This is one
of the most thorny problems of reforming the Russian economy, and
may be a tough issue to resolve.
   The announced agreement to allow the Russian government to bid
for the launch of an Inmarsat satellite on a Proton launch vehicle
should not be affected.  The Russian bid should be accepted if it
doesn't bid an absolutely absurd price -- and the rumors are they
are bidding about 30% less than US or European competitor rather
than the 95% less price rumored elsewhere.  Indeed, the Inmarsat
deal is being seen in some sectors as an experiment to gather data
on Russian market mechanisms.]

3- INMARSAT CREATES CONTROVERSY WITH LAUNCH SERVICES RE-BID
   Inmarsat, the International Maritime Satellite Organization, has
stirred up a furor with a recent action on bid for launch services.
From information released in the trade press, Inmarsat had requested
bids for launch of four Inmarsat 3 series satellites.  Bids were
received from several parties, with General Dynamics winning  a
contract for launch of the first two satellites.  The third
satellite is expected to be launched on the Proton.  However, the
round of bidding for the last satellite has become wrapped in
controversy.
   Apparently, General Dynamics bid $61 M for launch and Arianespace
bid $72 M.  The bid was listed in the procurement RFP as being based
upon best price.  But rather than awarding the contract to GD, Olof
Lundberg, director general of Inmarsat, recommended the fourth
satellite launch contract should be given to Arianespace -- if a
price could be negotiated to within 4% of GD's price.
   [Commentary:  I'm going to make the rest of this commentary as at
this point the facts get sparse and there's a lot of politics and
flame going around about this.
   Inmarsat claims that they allowing Arianespace to rebid to
maintain a second source of launchers other than GD.  GD claims this
violates the terms of the RFP and since both firms have already
submitted a Best and Final Offer (BAFO) the award should be based
only upon the submitted BAFOs and not on any yet-to-be-negotiated
price. Furthermore, GD states if the price is to be re-bid by
Arianespace, GD would also like an opportunity to re-bid as well.
   The US government, with Comsat Corp acting as its representative,
is a member of Inmarsat and has protested this action within
Inmarsat.  In a letter of 30 June, the US representative to Inmarsat
said the action by Lundberg "violated the very heart of the Inmarsat
procurement process and undermines the critical principle of true
competitive bidding".
   GD has been very active on the political/regulatory front as
well, having taken this dispute to the regulating agencies in the US
government - and I have seen data the US State, Commerce, and
Transportation departments are all looking at it.  It is expected
the National Space Council will chair an interagency group to
coordinate responses from the US government on this.
   In all, Inmarsat has stirred up a real hornet's nest.  In my
opinion GD has some very valid arguments about this competition.
While Inmarsat also has valid concerns about maintaining a second
source of supply, it is highly unlikely that Arianespace will go out
of business if they don't get this one launch contract -- and from
what data I can gather, it appears Inmarsat is violating the letter
of the RFP on the basis for the award of the contract.
   If Inmarsat had wanted to maintain Ariane as the second supplier
at the start of the contractual competition, they could have placed
language in the contract such that Inmarsat reserved the option to
place the contract on other than a lowest price basis - but they
didn't.  Similarly, they could have maintained Ariane as a second
source by directing a procurement to them, and not making it a
competitive bid, but this would have changed the Inmarsat launch
services procurement method. (Inmarsat would have had to write the
equivalent of the "single source procurement justification" and have
it approved by the Inmarsat government council - which would have
been done, in my opinion).  Or, Inmarsat could have awarded the
contract to GD, and paralleled it with a small Ariane contract for
analysis and interface hardware to maintain Ariane readiness as a
second source.
    This contentious issue, coming at a time when competitive trade
issues in space launch are very highly visible, has caused major
waves in the international trade community.  The US government is
even reported to be considering denying the export license for the
US-built Inmarsat 3 satellite concerned if this issue isn't
resolved.  There will be another meeting later this year of the
Inmarsat governing council, and this is expected to be a major issue
until then.]

4- ATLAS/CENTAUR FAILURE CHALLENGES GD'S LAUNCH BUSINESS
   After one of two Centaur second-stage engines failed to ignite on
22 August, range safety destroyed an Atlas launch vehicle, racking
up a $160 M failure for GD's commercial launch business.  This was
the second failure in 16 months for Atlas.
   While the reason for this failure is not known, it was similar to
the previous Atlas failure on 18 April 1991, when another Centaur
engine didn't ignite.  That failure was traced to debris in a fuel
line.
   General Dynamics and the Air Force has formed an independent
failure review oversight board chaired by Forrest McCartney, former
director of KSC.  This board oversees a 30-member GD team studying
the latest launch failure.  The two biggest customers for upcoming
Atlas launches, AT&T and Hughes, also are represented.
   [Commentary: This can only be seen as a major impact on General
Dynamics' commercial launch business.  It is not uncommon for
customers participate on failure investigation boards, but Hughes
has lost two of their satellites on Atlas (the Japan DBS satellite
lost on the last failure was also built by Hughes) and has another
dozen Hughes-built or Hughes-owned satellites scheduled for launch.
While AT&T is not a satellite manufacturer, it has booked its entire
next generation satellite network on Atlas and is reportedly
concerned about the safety of its $1 B+ investment.
   Since GD is currently competing for new Intelsat and Inmarsat
launch contracts and bidding head-to-head with Arianespace, this is
going to hurt them in the competition.  Similarly, they are trying
to line up customers for their new Atlas II series of launchers, and
these failures on the "tried and proven" Atlas I series may make
customers more leery of using the Atlas II until they have more
flight experience.
   It should also be noted this loss valued at $159.5 M (satellite
and launch) wipes out 70% of all space insurance premiums paid so
far this year.  While premium payments may total of $440 M by the
end of the year, that number assumes the launch of all 6 scheduled
Arianes and the 2 remaining scheduled Atlases.  Since the next
Ariane (with Hippasat and Satcom) is carrying $300M in insurance, it
is very quickly calculated the insurance industry can very quickly
show a major loss.  Current launch insurance rates of 15-20% can
possibly grow -- particularly for Atlas, which the insurance
industry ranks as a reliability of 75% over the past 20 launches,
and 80% over the past 25. [Note: since I wrote this, Hippasat and
Satcom were successfully launched on Ariane.]
   The only note of inadvertent humor out of all this was that
Charles Lloyd, VP and managing director of General Dynamics
Commercial Launch Services, was quoted as saying it was
"particularly disappointing that we failed to provide Hughes
Communications Inc. a good launch - as they are one of our largest
customers."   To which the obvious response is - "And if they
weren't one of your largest customers, you wouldn't be
disappointed?"

5- "WHITE KNIGHT" FOR CAPE YORK? ONE MORE (LAST?) ATTEMPT ...
   The latest in a procession of firms who have tried to develop a
commercial space port on Australia's Cape York Peninsula has
appeared.  According to press reports, the Cape York International
Spacelaunch Ltd (CYISL), has started to raise a projected $1 B (US)
to fund the project.  CYISL is headed by Robert Cooksey of Australia
and Ian Whitehead of England, and is reportedly supported by six
major companies.  The identities of these companies has not been
released by Cooksey or Whitehead on the grounds of confidentiality,
but supposedly the firms have expertise in aerospace systems, launch
site design and construction, infrastructure development, range
systems, systems integration and launch program management, and
facilities management and logistics support.
    But if CYISL is to develop the project, it must move quickly.  A
recent Australian review of their national space program recommended
government support for the Cape York effort be terminated if private
funds to proceed are not found by the end of the year.
   [Commentary: Another round in the saga of Cape York.  I hope
CYISL can pull off finding financing, but it is not a good sign when
an organization says "I've got a billion dollars - just trust me".
There are some unanswered questions about Cape York's viability that
need to be resolved, and in my opinion, I think this may be one of
the last gasps of its entrepreneurial viability.
   I've talked with representatives from the Australian Space Office
about this venture, and it looks good in a spreadsheet, given
several key factors.  The most important was the availability of
cheap Soviet/Russian boosters taken from a concurrent major Soviet/
Russian production run.  Recently the Russian launch rate has
plummeted and while cheap boosters are still being marketed, the
sustainability of having cheap boosters from a humming production
line is somewhat questionable.  The availability of raw materials
and components within the CIS has also become questionable as some
of the CIS supplier firms have gone out of business due to lack of
funds and raw materials, and this is looking like another problem
for cheap Russian boosters available for Cape York.
   Secondly, the financial numbers for Cape York were highly
dependent upon capturing a significant number of annual launches.
The numbers presented represented about a 50% market share of the
commercial launch market.  Obviously, this would be strongly
contested by Arianespace, US launch firms, and the Chinese.  Highly
competitive and speculative market positioning was also one of the
achilles heels of the Cape York proposals.
   Lastly, the investment needed in Cape York is significant;
estimates range from a few hundreds of millions up to a billion
dollars or more.  This large amount of funds for a very speculative
investment was difficult for investors to swallow as a lump, and was
made more speculative by the unwillingness of the Australian
national government to guarantee or otherwise support such a large
investment sum -- while the Australian government kept control the
regulatory powers over Cape York's operations.  While the state
government and the ASO was very supportive of the effort to develop
a Cape York launch site, it has been very difficult to put together
the needed financial consortium given the speculative supply and
market factors given above, and unresolved political issues.
   Perhaps this is the last gasp in the Cape York saga?  Unless
something drastic changes, the probability of a commercial spaceport
at Cape York seems to be fading away.  Unless a miracle of financial
legerdemain happens, I believe the venture might only gasp on for
another year or two before disappearing.]

6- SKYPIX IN BANKRUPTCY COURT; HUGHES DIRECT TV MOVES FORWARD
   SkyPix Corp., which was planning to introduce a satellite
broadcasting service offering 80 channels of direct-to-home video
programming, is not in bankruptcy court in Seattle.  Creditors of
the corporation are arguing that SkyPix should be forced into
chapter 11 and operation of the firm be taken over by a court-
appointed trustee.
   In return, SkyPix has fired off a barrage of lawsuits against the
other parties involved in the venture.  SkyPix is seeking damages of
more than $44 M from Compression Labs claiming that the first of 350
decoder units ordered from them were defective and did not function
to specification.  In return, Compression Labs claims SkyPix
contractually agreed the devices performed satisfactorily and to pay
$1M owed by SkyPix to Compression Labs.
   SkyPix is also seeking $ 53 M in actual and punitive damages from
the Home Shopping Network, Inc., alleging it failed to negotiate in
good faith after signing a joint-venture agreement and promising to
contribute $15.5 M in cash and a similar amount in services.  SkyPix
is claiming a $6.2 M promissory note signed to Home Shopping was
done at the insistence of Home Shopping as Home Shopping insisted
SkyPix guarantee that amount to reserve broadcasting slots on Hughes
Communications satellites.  Home Shopping called SkyPix's suit "an
obvious attempt to dodge the debt."
   SkyPix is also suing two past presidents of the corporation.
   In other news, DirecTv Inc., a subsidiary of Hughes
Communications Inc., has officially broken ground for a new facility
dedicated to distributing satellite television for Hughes' 150-
channel direct-to-home programming services.  The new 40,000 sq ft
facility in Castle Rock, CO is expected to cost between $7 and $8 M,
and to be completed by June 1993.
   DirecTv services are planned to begin in 1994.  As described by
Hughes, the service will allow viewer to receive the programming
through a "low-cost home receiving system consisting of an 18-inch
satellite antenna and a set-top decoder box."
   [Commentary:  I ran across these two peripherally related news
items in my files and thought they made an interesting comparison.
The Direct Broadcasting Satellite (DBS) market has historically been
a dynamic market with lots of ups and downs, and these two ventures
show that range of circumstances.
   SkyPix had raised several tens of millions of dollars from a
variety of sources including a substantial number of private
investors, but has had problems meeting its scheduled developments
and in lining up the next round of investors.  The suits and
counter-suits indicate some of the investors are getting very leery
about getting their money back and have lost confidence in the
management and direction of SkyPix.  The two suits against
Compression Labs and Home Shopping also indicate key suppliers and
customers may also have lost confidence in the venture.
   In comparison, the Hughes venture seems to be proceeding
relatively smoothly.  Hughes has a good track record in operating
satellite TV distribution systems and in providing services to most
of the major broadcasters and cable services - including major
players in the international and foreign markets.  From my current
files on DirecTV, it seems Hughes has taken a significantly
different path than SkyPix -- focusing on providing broadcast
services to other firms who provide the programming, rather than
trying to enter the more competitive video programming arena
themselves.  However, DirecTv has not yet shown financial or market
viability, and it will be some time before we can assess the profit/
loss of this approach for DBS services.
    As a last note, these systems offer 80 or 150 channels of
"entertainment".  While I'm as much of a video junkie as anyone
else, I still have to wonder -- are there really enough good movies
and shows and events such that a firm can profitably fill up the DBS
transmission?.  And if there are 2 or 3 competing services, then
there would have to be 160-450 simultaneous channels?.
    I believe programming is the achilles heel of DBS.  There are
only so many channels of "Wheel of Fortune", "Home Shopping Network"
minor league baseball, and reruns of "Gilligan's Island" that can be
shown profitably.]

7- JOINT VENTURE TO PRODUCE ELECTRIC SATELLITE PROPULSION UNITS
   A few months ago, it was agreed that Russian "Hall Effect"
thrusters would be sold to Loral Space Systems.  In recent news,
Space Systems/Loral, the Fakel Experimental Design Bureau of
Kaliningrad and the Research Institute of Applied Mechanics and
Electrodynamics in Moscow have formed a joint venture called
International Space Technology Inc. to sell and produce satellite
stationkeeping propulsion systems.  The system would use these
Russian thrusters and US electronics to compete with existing liquid
propellant satellite stationkeeping systems.  According to Loral, an
integrated system using Russian stationary plasma thrusters could
cut the weight of stationkeeping systems on geosynchronous
satellites by as much as 20%.  This technology will be marketed to
other satellite manufacturers and to US government customers.
   [Commentary: This is just a quick mention of the first real joint
business venture I've noted for space hardware.  While there are
several similar ventures in the aviation field (as an example, the
recent debut of Rolls Royce engines and Rockwell avionics on Russian
manufactured jetliners), I've not noticed joint US/Russian space
business ventures bringing joint hardware to the market - up to now.
   The past few months have seen several significant activities
between US, Japanese, and European firms to really catalog and
explore Russian technology and systems for commercially viable
products.  I believe the next year or so will see additional joint
business ventures with the Russians to bring specific subsystems and
elements into the international commercial market.]

8- STATE OF ALASKA TO BACK COMMERCIAL SMALL LAUNCH COMPANY?
   The Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority (AIDEA), a
state-funded development agency, is considering providing financial
backing to International MicroSpace Inc. (IMI).  IMI is proposing to
build a small launch vehicle based upon in-production solid rocket
motors and other off-the-shelf components.
   IMI has been discussing use of the Poker Flats launch range
located north of Fairbanks with the Alaskan Aerospace Development
Corp..  The AADC was founded by the Alaskan state legislature to
expand the small aerospace industry base in Alaska and in
particular, to expand the use of the Poker Flat range.  This
activity is strongly supported by the Alaskan congressional
delegation and the state's governor.
   According to news reports, IMI approached AIDEA just before
submitting a bid for the recent SDIO small ELV launch contract (see
past issues of "Commercial Space News").  As part of the bid, IMI
had to show financial viability, and AIDEA agreed to help provide
backing for IMI.
   At AIDEA, several funding options were examined  -- including
funding IMI through the states's venture capital fund (the Polaris
Fund) which has already invested $700,000 in IMI, for AIDEA to buy
launch facilities and "lease" then back to IMI, and for transference
to funds from AIDEA to the AADC which would in turn, provide $3M as
a loan to IMI.  Current reports are the loan from AADC to IMI will
be offered, contingent upon a set of conditions which IMI must meet.
These conditions include the Herndon, VA-based company moving its
headquarters to Alaska and changing its charter to an Alaskan
corporation.
   [Commentary:  I've been following the effort to develop a launch
industry in Alaska for some time.  The Alaskan state government has
been looking for means of diversifying the state's economy.  Space
activities of even $10-$50 M per year could have a major impact,
considering Alaska has only 500,000 or so citizens.
   Complicating this is IMI just won that SDIO contract, worth about
$12.6 M for the launch of the MISTI-4 payload from SDIO (with
options for another potential 9 launches).  At the same time, AADC
is hiring Pat Ladner from SDIO as its new executive director, and
AADC will be funding IMI.
   Some of the other small launch firms have raised their eyebrows
at this apparently incestuous relationship.
   However, from what I've been able to see,  Ladner had removed
himself from any procurement activities at SDIO some months ago;
well before the MISTI/Small ELV procurements were even released.
There is no evidence of any ties between him and any of these
procurement offers and any influence on any pertinent procurement
action.
   I hope Ladner and the AADC are successful at developing an
orbital launch infrastructure in Alaska.  Poker Flat is the only
privately-owned and operated launch range in North America (it's
owned by the University of Alaska corporation), and might offer an
private competitor to the government owned and operated ranges
farther south.
   IMI might also have some interesting spinoffs for the AADC as
well - they are part of a joint venture with Defense Systems Inc
(one of the leading smallsat manufacturers) and Pacific
Communications Sciences Inc to build, launch, and operate a LEO
smallsat communications constellation.  That venture, called
Constellation Communications Inc, was one of the firms given a
preliminary license from the FCC to launch and test their system.
(see below).  IMI looks like a reasonable bet by the Alaskan
Aerospace Development Corp to bring some business to Alaska.]

9- THREE FIRMS AWARDED INITIAL LEO COMMUNICATIONS ALLOCATIONS
   On 5 August, the FCC proposed opening the frequencies 1610-1626.5
Mhz and 2483.5-2500 MHz for mobile satellite communications services
in accord with the International Telecommunication Union as
established at the last World Administrative Radio Conference
(WARC).  This opened up the spectrum for US LEO communications
satellite  constellations.
   To give initial licenses for services in these bands, the FCC was
planning to provide "pioneer's preference" to see if any firm which
had filed for LEO satellite services should be given a head start on
approval (see past issues of CSN for a description of the process
and some of the maneuvering between competitors to get this
"pioneer's preference").  However, the FCC found none of the
applications submitted for LEO constellations have provided enough
of a jump in technology or innovation over its competitors, and
their proposed techniques weren't so much of a quantum leap as much
as derived from previous techniques.  This disappointed some of the
firms, but as was explained by Tom Stanley, the FCC chief engineer,
the FCC sets the threshold for a "pioneer's preference" extremely
high, and to get the approved head start through the licensing
process an applications has to almost be an enabling technology for
dramatically new services.
   Three of the 5 "big" LEO applications were granted an
experimental launch and operations license, including:
   Constellation Communications (a joint venture from Pacific
Communications Sciences Inc, Defense Systems Inc, and International
Microspace Inc,) to launch and operate 2 satellites, a ground
control station, and up to 100 ground terminals.
   Ellipsat (TRW) to launch and operate 4 satellites, 1 ground
station, and up to 1000 user terminals,
   Motorola/Iridium to launch and operate 5 satellites, 2 ground
stations (each in a different frequency), up to 100 user terminals,
and 2 aircraft.
    The FCC warned the applicants they spend funds on these
satellites at their own risk since the service and frequency sharing
rules for such systems are not in place.  While each firm expects to
use their experimental satellites as part of an eventual full,
operational constellation, that may not be feasible.  Initial
experiments have to be performed and some sort of negotiated rule
making made to determine how differing systems and services can best
share the spectrum.
   On the "small" LEO side, most applicants for frequencies below 1
GHz have agreed on service rules and have completed a spectrum
sharing plan.  But while Orbcomm, Starsys, and VITA have jointly
agreed, Leosat is still appealing its FCC application dismissal due
to a late filing fee, and the Air Force is re-voicing a concern
about availability of spectrum in that frequency range for on-going
military operations.  Orbcomm, Starsys, and VITA are hoping this
will be quickly resolved and the FCC will rule on their applications
by the end of the year.
   [Commentary: Round Two of the LEO communications satellite
competition is now starting.  I expect a flurry of near-term
activity to line up financing, get satellite construction contracts
moving, and to start lining up launch services and ground system
contracts.  However, this still Round 2, and each firm will have to
accept a significant amount of financial and business risk,
dependent upon the outcome of the systems and service tests.
   The biggest issue seems to be the FDMA/TDMA scheme proposed for
use on the Motorola/Iridium satellites. Virtually all of the other
bidders insist that if Motorola is given an allocation in the
frequency spectrum, no other firm can also use that operating band.
Motorola insists that the CDMA schemes proposed by the other
applications also have the same problem.  This was a sufficiently
serious concern that when a rumor started circulating that Motorola
was to get the coveted "pioneer's preference", TRW, one of the other
"big" LEO applicants filed an emergency petition for a writ of
prohibition with the US Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia
to stop all "pioneer preferences".
   The next round's results will have to be judged through the FCC
for technical merit and compatibility.  I'd expect a minimum
commitment to get through this round at about $100 M (2 sats at $25
M, 2 launches at $20 M, ground station at $5M, and 100 ground
terminals at $10 K, plus $10 M in test, development, and
documentation).  Then we'll see real $$ invested if an operational
system(s) is approved.]

10- LANDSAT COMMERCIALIZATION MAY BE REVOKED
   [I've been not reporting or commenting on the current changes
going on with Landsat, since there are a lot of differing proposals
and competing options.  However, this latest could have significant
impacts on the Earth Resources space market segment.]
   Under a bill accepted on 11 August by the Senate Commerce,
Science and Transportation Committee, the EOSAT corporation would be
stripped of their exclusive rights to market Landsat data.  The
Senate "Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992" would apply to data
produced by the Landsat 7 satellite, planned for launch in 1997 to
replace the aging Landsat 6 satellite now in orbit.
   This bill was introduced by Sen. Larry Pressler (R-S.D.), and
states "The cost of unenhanced Landsat data has impeded the use of
such data for scientific purposes, such as for global environmental
change research, as well as for other public sector applications."
It also states "...Full commercialization of the Landsat program
cannot be achieved within the foreseeable future, and thus should
not serve as the near-term goal of national policy on land remote
sensing."
   If passed, the bill orders negotiations with EOSAT Corp to ensure
all Landsat data (including archived data from previous Landsats
prior to Landsat 7) be made available to government agencies and
government-sponsored researchers "at the cost of fulfilling user
requests." Beginning with Landsat 7, management of the program would
revert to the government, and all data would be made available at
the cost of fulfilling a data order.
   In contrast, the House has proposed a Landsat bill with a 2-
tiered fee schedule including a lower rate for non-commercial
(governmental and academic) users.  A memorandum of understanding
(MOU) between EOSAT and NASA had been signed in late July that would
have provided Landsat data to NASA global change researchers at a
deep discount with EOSAT to use the proceeds from such sales to fund
a grant program for research into new ways of using Landsat data.
   [Commentary: My believe this Senate bill is not in the best
interest of commercial space activities.  The Europeans have
"commercialized" SPOT by developing new SPOT satellites under
government/ESA funding and then turning the operational satellites
over to SPOT Image to sell the data.  The revenues generated from
SPOT are not yet high enough to provide a basis for a commercial buy
of new SPOT satellites, but the Europeans have been continuing to
provide new generations of SPOT.  Revenue streams are continuing to
grow at about 20% annually for remote sensing data sales, but it
will be at least another decade before this market segment will be
large enough to support a fully commercial large satellite
construction, launch and data collection venture.
   In contrast, the US government commercialized the Landsat program
by turning over the operational Landsat to EOSAT, and never provided
the funds for replacing Landsats or upgrading their technology.  At
the same time, the prices of acquiring Landsat data were allowed to
rise to market rates, over the subsidized government prices before
EOSAT.  Now, some NASA and academic researchers are saying "What? We
have to pay for data?  At market rates?" and have been working
behind the scenes to lobby for "at cost of reproduction" data to be
provided to them. (In their defense, I should note the grants and
budgets they are working on were never increased to reflect the cost
of acquiring the data needed, and paying market prices for data has
taken a big chunk out of their budgets.)
   But "uncommercializing" Landsat is NOT the way to promote
commercialization of space.  What should be done is to provide the
funds for NASA and academic researchers to pay market rates for
remote sensing data -- if the government is going to fund such
research.
   Furthermore, my opinion is if the government is to promote the
development of this area of the market, then they should also
guarantee a market of size and quality sufficient for EOSAT to place
a commercial procurement for a Landsat follow-on system (not
necessarily for Landsat 7 as a clone of Landsat 6), and let EOSAT or
an equivalent firm market its data to users.  If the government is
guaranteeing the market (which is not doing now) then it could
provide the data so procured to government funded academic
researchers and other government agencies (NASA, NOAA, and the DoD)
sources at minimum cost.  The government market guarantees should
phase-out into a fully commercial system as the revenues grow to
allow this.
   Uncommercializing the US Landsat system is only a step backwards
for space commercialization.   There are many more constructive
steps that can be made rather than adding road blocks to this
growing area of space commerce.]

 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Wales Larrison                         Space Technology Investor
 "Fortis cadere,                            P.O. Box 2452
  cedere non potest"                     Seal Beach, CA 90740-1452

------------------------------

Date: 21 Sep 92 15:22:37 GMT
From: Pat <[e-mail]>
Subject: New lunar spacecraft (& old data formats)
Newsgroups: sci.space

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (John Stevenson) writes:
>
>
>The reference goes on to note that the radionavigation data was acquired
>from the NSDC on 7 track tapes, which no one any longer had the software (
>or even tape drives?) to read.  The reference then goes on to discuss the
>various boxes of punched cards which may or may not contain the required
>data. So it appears that the information is not yet lost, but the will (
>or dollars) to recover it may be.
>
>

Gee,  sounds like no-one at NSSDC has ever done commercial data processing.
When i lived in chicago, veitually every decent sized computer center
had their own little museum of computer technology.  old obscure hardware
running  some little job that no-one ever fixed up for modern times.
at one site we had a tabulating punch vintage 1930's that we would
dust off every year to run one old end of year job.  no-one had the time
to modernize it, and besides we liked the fun of that old beast.

there were also shops that specialized in obscure stuff.  want time on a cdc600
no problem.  maybe nssdc should pay some money and they will
find someone who can reprocess the data.

------------------------------

Date: 21 Sep 92 10:14:49 GMT
From: [e-mail]
Subject: Population
Newsgroups: sci.space

In <[e-mail]> David Knapp writes:
>Do you think it is always appropriate to always give other species the
>short end of the stick if it inconveniences man? How about the other way
>around? I've never heard anybody favor either way.
  Talk to greenpeace then. They want to outlaw the way of life for
many whaling communities. They _don't_ however, offer to compensate
these people, they just implicitly assume that they are morally superior.
>What kind of stuff are you reading?
 Mostly Usenet ... :-)
>>Environmentalists tend to regard Man as
>>seperate from nature, as if we were some alien interlopers, rather
>>than an integral part. Even their choice of language shows this.
>Hmm, I'm an environmentalist and that's not how I regard man. I'd say
>you were wrong.
  Nope ... as you've pointed out. You worry about the changes we cause,
as if they are somehow 'unnatural'. Your (implicit) assumption is that
the changed wrought by Man shouldn't happen, yet if 'twere another
species caught in the act, this would be alright .. yes ?
The bottom line is that everything we do is natural, as we are an
integral part of nature. You can debate the rights and wrong of our
imposing our will on the planet in human ethical terms, however you
cannot debate it as a 'crime against nature', for you cannot know what
nature intends. If you are an ardent Gaia-ist, it is possible to make
the premise that humans colonising other planets (reproducing Gaia) is
worth almost any sacrifice (notice the space connection here ??).
>> It can be overdone however.
>Well that's true of *every* subject, isn't it.
  Yes, however how many environmentalists are prepared to accept this
argument applying to their particular hobby horse ???
>> The environment is going to
>>change no matter what.
>Hmm, You and I might have a different idea of how the environment would change
>with or without man. I'd say he's having a rather profound effect.
 And you regard this as 'unnatural' right ??? :-)  Why are you seperating
Man's changes from those caused by other species ??
>You're right. Species do come and go. Which species,so far, has been responsible

>for the most species 'going'?
As has been already pointed out, it was blue green algae. Man is a
piker when compared to other causes.
 -----------------------------------------------------------------
               ** Of course I don't speak for IBM **
Greg Nicholls ... [e-mail] or [e-mail]
                  voice/fax: [phone]

------------------------------

Date: 21 Sep 92 16:08:59 GMT
From: alan l wendt <[e-mail]>
Subject: Space Platforms (political, not physical :-)
Newsgroups: sci.space,talk.politics.space,alt.politics.marrou,alt.politics.libertarian

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Nick Szabo) writes:
>
>From memory, the Libertarian platform has two signficant statements on space:
>
>* Disband NASA, turning over science to the universities, R&D
>  operations to commerce, and anything the military needs to the
>  military.
>

In the back of their recent "Fallen Angels", Larry Niven & Co. argue that
the cargo-carrying capacity of the shuttle could be achieved for about 1%
of its current cost.   More specifically, in terms of # of employees per
aircraft:

    Commercial carriers:        135
        R71B (Blackbird):            40
    NASA Shuttle support ops:  5000

They further claim that the fuel cost of low-earth orbit is about the same
as that of North America to Australia.   100 miles vertical instead of
2000 horizontal.  Sounds reasonable to me but they've done more study than I.

Alan Wendt

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End of Space Digest Volume 15 : Issue 229
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